All too often in the discussion relating to the behaviour of the Visions cult and its members reference has frequently been made to the traditions, guidelines and indeed concepts as if these were the sole parameters by which an assessment should be made of the ethical conduct of these groups and their members.
We would argue that we have both a legal and a moral duty of care to our fellows and that this duty takes precedence over any of the foregoing considerations.
Legal duty of care
Consider the following extracts from the Wikipedia entry with special reference to the section emphasised in red:
“In tort, there can be no liability in negligence unless the claimant establishes both that he or she was owed a duty of care by the defendant, and that there has been a breach of that duty."
We would argue that we have both a legal and a moral duty of care to our fellows and that this duty takes precedence over any of the foregoing considerations.
Legal duty of care
Consider the following extracts from the Wikipedia entry with special reference to the section emphasised in red:
“In tort, there can be no liability in negligence unless the claimant establishes both that he or she was owed a duty of care by the defendant, and that there has been a breach of that duty."
Explanation:
The perennial problem for the court in each new situation has been to decide whether a duty of care was owed and, if so, what its scope was to be. The first judicial approach was to identify specific and distinctive situations in which a duty would exist. The law therefore developed in a piecemeal fashion. In Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) AC 562, Lord Atkin observed at 579-580:
“The result is that the courts have been engaged upon an elaborate classification of duties as they exist in respect of property, whether real or personal, with further divisions as to ownership, occupation or control, and distinctions based on the particular relations of the one side or the other, whether manufacturer, salesman or landlord, customer, tenant, stranger, and so on. In this way it can be ascertained at any time whether the law recognises a duty, but only where the case can be referred to some particular species which has been examined and classified. And yet the duty which is common to all the cases where liability is established must logically be based upon some element common to the cases where it is found to exist."
Lord Atkin considered whether to formulate a single general principle that could be applied in all circumstances to determine the existence of a duty of care at 580:
"To seek a complete logical definition of the general principle is probably to go beyond the function of the judge, for the more general the definition the more likely it is to omit essentials or to introduce non-essentials."
Nevertheless, Lord Atkin did produce what came to be recognised as a landmark statement of principle:
"The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."
In Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v Home Office (1970) AC 1004, Lord Reid said at 1026-1027:
"In later years there has been a steady trend towards regarding the law of negligence as depending on principle so that, when a new point emerges, one should ask not whether it is covered by authority but whether recognised principles apply to it. Donoghue v Stevenson may be regarded as a milestone, and the well known passage in Lord Atkin's speech should I think be regarded as a statement of principle. It is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. But I think that the time has come when we can and should say that it ought to apply unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion."
The most comprehensive attempt to formulate a single general principle was made by Lord Wilberforce in Anns v Merton London Borough Council (1978) AC 728, at 751-752:
"Through the trilogy of cases in this House - Donoghue v Stevenson, Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v Heller & Partners Ltd. (1964) AC 465, and Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v Home Office, the position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter - in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise."
But following the Anns case, a series of decisions were critical of the notion that a single general principle could be applied to every situation: see Governors of Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd. (1985) AC 210; Yuen Kun Yeu v Attorney-General of Hong Kong (1988) AC 175; Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd. (1988) AC 473; Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1989) AC 53. The test that emerged was:
- foreseeability of damage, i.e. that in the particular circumstances and not with the benefit of hindsight (per Roe v Minister of Health (1954) 2 AER 131), a hypothetical reasonable person would have foreseen damage (see Moran: 2003);
- a relationship of "proximity" or "neighbourhood" between the parties, i.e. the Atkin's "neighbour" test; and
- that it should be fair, just, and reasonable to impose a duty of a given scope upon the one party for the benefit of the other.
But it was implicit that the concepts of "proximity" and "fairness" could not be defined with sufficient certainty to underpin a universal test. Thus, the law moved back slightly towards the more traditional categorisation of distinct and recognisable situations as guides to the existence, the scope, and the limits of the varied duties of care which the law imposes. This mirrored the trend in Australia. In the High Court of Australia in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 60 ALR 1, Brennan J. said at 43-44:
"It is preferable, in my view, that the law should develop novel categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established categories, rather than by a massive extension of a prima facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable 'considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed.'" “
[See link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breach_of_duty_in_English_law]
Generally negligent acts refer to those that cause physical harm to others. It might be argued that to give advice on medical matters to another individual who trusts that judgement and acts upon it and then subsequently suffers as a result of this advice might have a case under the law of tort.
Moral duty of care
We refer you back to the beginning of Lord Atkin’s statement of principle above:
[See link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breach_of_duty_in_English_law]
Generally negligent acts refer to those that cause physical harm to others. It might be argued that to give advice on medical matters to another individual who trusts that judgement and acts upon it and then subsequently suffers as a result of this advice might have a case under the law of tort.
Moral duty of care
We refer you back to the beginning of Lord Atkin’s statement of principle above:
"The rule that you are to love your neighbour ……”
We believe that we have a responsibility to have regard for the welfare of other members of AA not only with reference to the content of the message that we carry but also the means by which it is conveyed to them. There is nothing to suggest either in the Big Book (Chapter 7 “Working With Others), in Step 12, in the Preamble, in the Traditions or indeed in the Concepts that any part of carrying that message involves abusive conduct towards other members. There is no indication from any of these sources that we acquire the right to direct their conduct, set conditions for their recovery, intrude in their private lives, or coerce and manipulate them in any way. We do not have the right to act as if we were anyone’s higher power. Step 3 states quite clearly: “Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we understood Him”. Additionally, if we consider the three pertinent ideas on p. 60 of the Big Book:
(a) That we were alcoholic and could not manage our own lives.
(b) That probably no human power could have relieved our alcoholism.
(c) That God could and would if He were sought.
If it is the case that we “ could not manage our own lives” then how is it that some of us have the arrogance to believe that we can manage others’ lives. The whole purpose of the programme is to create the conditions for each individual to have a spiritual awakening and from that source derive the power to remain sober. Our moral purpose is to support the arising of those conditions, not to bludgeon them into another human being. It was not our intention in coming to AA to swap the tyranny of alcoholism for the tyranny of another alcoholic. The recovery programme in no way endorses the use of bullying frequently presented under the guise of so-called “tough love”. Any approach that underpins the use of emotional violence in conveying the message of recovery is a moral perversion and completely alien to the spirit of the fellowship.
(b) That probably no human power could have relieved our alcoholism.
(c) That God could and would if He were sought.
If it is the case that we “ could not manage our own lives” then how is it that some of us have the arrogance to believe that we can manage others’ lives. The whole purpose of the programme is to create the conditions for each individual to have a spiritual awakening and from that source derive the power to remain sober. Our moral purpose is to support the arising of those conditions, not to bludgeon them into another human being. It was not our intention in coming to AA to swap the tyranny of alcoholism for the tyranny of another alcoholic. The recovery programme in no way endorses the use of bullying frequently presented under the guise of so-called “tough love”. Any approach that underpins the use of emotional violence in conveying the message of recovery is a moral perversion and completely alien to the spirit of the fellowship.
Finally each member has to decide for himself or herself to what extent they are willing to stand by and let these abuses continue unchecked before they take action. But it is now our view that the time is rapidly approaching where we would rather that suffering alcoholics went elsewhere for assistance rather than run the risk of coming to our Fellowship if all they can expect is further abuse and neglect.
